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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Standard of Review for Findings of Fact. 
Throughout Respondent's Brief, reference is made to the case 
of Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985), in support 
of an incorrect standard of review by the Appellate Court 
with respect to the trial court's findings of fact. The 
correct standard of review has been enunciated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in its subsequent decisions of State of Utah 
v. Bryan Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), and Western Kane 
County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle 
Company, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). Pursuant to these more 
recent decisions, if the trial court's findings of fact are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings shall 
be set aside on appeal. 
2. Standard of Review With Respect to Conclusions of 
Law. While findings of fact will not be set aside 
ordinarily unless they are clearly erroneous, conclusions of 
law are simply reviewable on appeal for their correctness, 
without any special deference. 
3. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. In this case, both the trial court's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous, and upon 
application of the correct standard of review on appeal, 
require reversal herein. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
RESPONDENT INCORRECTLY DEFINES THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRED BY UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR FINDINGS OF 
FACT BY THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
At pages 16 and 17 of Respondent's Brief, Respondent 
argues that the universally recognized and established rule 
in this state, pursuant to Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Bennion v. Hansen, supra, is that "findings of 
the trial court will not be disturbed unless there is no 
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record of evidence to support them, viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's ruling." However, effective 
January 1, 1987, a new Rule 52(a) became effective in this 
state, and in its 1987 decisions of State of Utah v. Bryan 
Walker, supra, and Western Kane County Special Service 
District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly specified the interpretation and 
application of Rule 52(a), specifically noting in Walker 
that: 
We disavow language in our earlier cases 
describing or implying a standard under 
new Rule 52(a) which differs in any 
significant respect from the standard of 
review applied in this case. 
Noting that the language of Rule 52(a) is similar to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that federal case law 
has defined the standard of review under the Federal Rule, 
the Utah Supreme Court in Walker cited a prominent federal 
authority as summarizing that standard as follows: 
It is not accurate to say that the 
appellate court takes that view of the 
evidence that is most favorable to the 
appellee, that it assumes that all 
conflicts in the evidence were resolved 
in his favor, and that he must be given 
the benefit of all favorable inferences. 
All of this is true in reviewing a jury 
verdict. It is not true when it is 
findings of the court that are being 
reviewed. Instead, the appellate court 
may examine all of the evidence in the 
record. It will presume that the trial 
court relied only on evidence properly 
admissible in making its finding in the 
absence of a clear showing to the 
contrary. It must give great weight to 
the findings made and the inferences 
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drawn by the trial judge, but it must 
reject his findings if it considers them 
to be clearly erroneous. Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, 
page 2585 (1971). 
The Utah Supreme Court then continues in Walker by 
citing the case of United States v. United States Gypsum 
Company, 333 *U.S. 364, 395 (1948), as defining the term 
"clearly erroneous" to mean: 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when, 
although there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. 
The Utah Supreme Court concludes in Walker that the content 
of the Utah Rule 52(a) "clearly erroneous" standard, 
imported from the Federal Rule, requires that if the 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings will 
be set aside. Similarly, under similar rules, courts in 
other jurisdictions have also concluded that the finding of 
the trial court is not necessarily binding upon an appellate 
court when it clearly appears from the whole record that 
such finding is wrong; and, that the power of a court of 
review ought not to be left paralyzed, so as to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice merely by the erroneous findings of 
the trial court. Thuringer v. Trafton, 58 Colo. 250, 144 P. 
866; Ortega v. Koury, 55 N.M. 142, 227 P.2d 941. 
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Notwithstanding the trial court's findings of fact, if 
the evidence clearly preponderates in the other direction, 
the appellate court should substitute its judgment for that 
of a trial judge sitting without a jury. In this case, the 
appellate court should review the record as a whole, and as 
set forth and referred to in Appellant's Brief, to see that, 
in fact, the preponderance of the evidence clearly shows 
that ther^ was essentially no dispute over the original 
contract price for the framing subcontract, or the amount 
remaining unpaid thereon, and the only real dispute was over 
extra work agreed to directly between the owners and 
subcontractors in light of the claimed offsets by the owners 
against the subcontractors, where the trial court 
specifically found the subcontract to have been 
substantially completed. 
II 
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE 
REVIEWABLE FOR CORRECTNESS, WITHOUT ANY 
SPECIAL DEFERENCE. 
In o^ rder to correctly apply the standard of review by 
the appellate court, a distinction must be made between its 
review of the findings of fact by the trial court, and its 
review of the trial court's conclusions of law. Citing its 
earlier decision in State v. Walker, supra, with approval, 
the Utah Supreme Court explained this distinction in its 
decision in Western Kane County Special Service District 
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No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, supra, (Utah 1987), by 
indicating: 
While findings of fact will not be set 
aside unless they are clearly erroneous, 
conclusions of law are simply reviewable 
for correctness without any special 
deference. 
Although findings of fact would not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous (as discussed above herein), sufficiency 
of the evidence is a question of law, subject to review as 
such by an appellate court. Howard v. Burlington, 399 Mass. 
585, 506 N.E.2d 102 (1987). In this case, then, the 
appellate court should review and determine the propriety of 
the trial court's conclusions of law, as well as review the 
sufficiency of the record and evidence as a whole, without 
benefit of any special deference or presumption in favor of 
the Whites. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, AND ITS CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ARE INCORRECT, REQUIRING REVERSAL 
ON APPEAL. 
As indicated in lines 7 through 22, page 994 of the 
Transcript, and by the Court's "Finding of Fact No. 13", the 
trial court found that Morgan had paid himself $3,007 "at 
the time the Hoths were to be paid", in January, 1987, plus 
$2,000 to meames at such time, and that had those amounts 
been paid to the framing subcontractors, no lien would have 
been filed and "he [Morgan] would never be in this lawsuit 
today", and this suit would have been unnecessary. 
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Moreover, the trial court continued, Morgan's failure to 
make such a payment to the framing subcontractor for the 
balance of their contract constituted a breach of contract 
between Morgan and Whites. 
As discussed in the Appellants' Brief, there was no 
testimony or evidence that Morgan's failure to pay Hoths in 
January of 1987 would constitute a breach of his contract 
with Whites. The agreement between Whites and Morgan itself 
does not support such a conclusion where Whites directly 
paid Morgan certain funds for construction costs, and 
indeed all of those monies (as shown by the record and 
discussed in the Appellants' Brief) were paid over by Morgan 
to meet construction creditors' claims, which if left 
unpaid would have permitted multiple mechanic's liens to 
have been filed. If Morgan had paid Hoths in January of 
1987, before the framing subcontract was completed, it would 
likely have compromised the owner's claims for offset, and 
suit would still have to be brought to recover them. 
Moreover, as indicated by paragraphs 10 and 11 of Whites' 
counterclaim, it was the owner's contention that the framing 
subcontractors were not to have been paid any more money 
until permanent financing had been obtained by Whites for 
the property. 
When the trial court ignored the detailed accounting 
testimony given by Morgan on the last day of trial, 
accounting for all monies paid to him on this project and 
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clearly showing their application to legitimate construction 
costs; and when the court determined that no other liens 
would have been filed and that this litigation would have 
been rendered unnecessary by Morgan's payment to Hoths in 
January of 1987 (instead of paying the other claims whicft 
Morgan testified to have paid with those funds at that 
time), the trikl court engaged in pure illogical supposition 
without any factual basis or relevancy in these 
proceedings. Consequently, its findings are not supported 
by the clear weight of the evidence, and are reversible as 
clearly erroneous. 
Similarly, after learning of this appeal, the trial 
court's modification of its findings to specifically find 
the existence of a partnership or joint venture? and its 
conclusion that Morgan had a duty to keep the property lien-
free after he could no longer control the finances or labor 
performed on the project; and the conclusion that the 
general contractor should indemnify the owners for the 
balance of the undisputed framing subcontract, as well as 
for extras performed per agreement between the owners and 
the subcontractors without his involvement (especially where 
the court has already given the owners the benefit of their 
claims against the subcontractor by offset); plus awarding 
the owners indemnity for all attorney fees in this matter, 
are conclusions of law which are blatantly incorrect, and 
which are reviewable for accuracy by this Court with no 
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special deference being accorded thereto. The specific 
nature of the errors committed by the trial court in its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are more 
specifically set forth and documented in the Appellants' 
Brief herein, and should be reviewed in the context of the 
correct appellate standard for review, depending upon 
whether the error occurred as a finding of fact, or as a 
conclusion of law, as those appellate standards of review 
are set forth hereinabove. 
Finally, pursuant to Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Morgan moved to amend his pleadings to conform to 
the evidence tried in this proceeding, and to clearly state 
his counterclaim for out-of-pocket losses and fees. 
Although the court granted the motion over White's 
objection, Whites have not appealed with respect thereto, 
except by oblique reference in Respondents1 Brief, page 3. 
Failure by the trial court to make any findings or 
conclusions whatsoever with respect to such counterclaim 
also constitutes reversible error with respect to which this 
Court is respectfully requested to enter findings and 
conclusions in accordance with the law, or remand the case 
on such issues for appropriate determination. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the position taken by the Whites in the 
Respondents' Brief, wherein it is asserted that the trial 
court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no 
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record of evidence to support them, viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's ruling, the recent decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court clearly indicate a different 
standard of review should be applied upon appeal• The 
correct standard to review the trial court's findings of 
fact is one in which, although there is evidences to support 
the trial court, the reviewing court on the entire evidence 
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed. 
With respect to the conclusions of law determined by 
the trial court, a separate and distinct standard of review 
is applicable. The Utah Supreme Court in its recent 
decision has defined that standard to be one in which this 
Court must simply review the correctness of the trial 
court's conclusions of law, without any special deference or 
presumption of accuracy. In this case, as a matter of law, 
there is not sufficient evidence to support the trial 
court's findings to which Appellants have taken exception; 
nor are the trial court's conclusions of law correct, to the 
extent that Appellants have appealed therefrom. Regardless 
of who the general contractor is, the court's conclusion 
that the general contractor should be responsible to pay the 
framing subcontractor the balance of the framing subcontract 
(essentially allowing the owners to obtain the benefit 
thereof for free, to that extent), and its further 
conclusion of law that the contractor should be responsible 
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for the costs of extra work performed by the framing 
subcontractor at the request of the owner, are clearly 
incorrect conclusions of law which should be reversed. 
Similarly, it is improper for the trial court to require, as 
a matter of law, that the contractor should be required to 
pay all of the attorneys' fees in this matter, particularly 
where most of the trial time and expense related to the 
resolution of the controversy between the subcontractor and 
the owners over the additional work performed by the 
subcontractor, and the asserted offsets by the owners. 
Failure to make any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law with respect to Morgan's counterclaim also constitutes 
reversible error. This Honorable Court should, sua sponte 
or on remand, provide for appropriate determinations to be 
made with respect to said counterclaim. 
Dated this /7 day of January, 1989. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
DALE G. SILER 
Attorney for Third-Party 
Defendants and Appellants 
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